What does zero-knowledge encryption mean in a password manager?
Client-side key derivation, AES-256-CBC + HMAC, PBKDF2 310k — and why the provider cannot read, reset, or recover your vault.
What does zero-knowledge encryption mean in a password manager?
Zero-knowledge encryption means your vault is encrypted on your device using a key derived from your master password before any data reaches the server. The provider (us) stores only ciphertext and never holds your key, your master password, or your biometric templates - there is no recovery backdoor.
| Security property | Standard cloud storage | LegendPass (zero-knowledge) |
|---|---|---|
| Where encryption happens | On the server or in the browser session | 100% on your device |
| Who holds the decryption key | The provider (they can read your data) | Only you — derived locally on your device |
| Can the provider reset your master password | Yes (classic forgot-password flow) | No — cryptographically impossible without your key |
| Cipher & integrity | Provider-managed (often TLS + server-AES at rest) | AES-256-CBC + HMAC (Encrypt-then-MAC) |
| Key derivation | N/A (provider-held) | PBKDF2 · 310,000 iterations |
| Biometric templates | Often server-side for convenience | Strictly on-device — never transmitted |
Inside LegendPass’s cryptographic stack
- Key derivation — PBKDF2 × 310,000: your master password is stretched on-device into a high-entropy key. Because each vault uses its own per-account salt, two members with the same master password derive different keys.
- Authenticated encryption — AES-256-CBC + HMAC (Encrypt-then-MAC): contents are encrypted with 256-bit AES and signed with an HMAC, so tampering with the ciphertext is detected at decryption time.
- No master password on the wire: it is never transmitted or stored in recoverable form.
The trade-off — why you must back up your master password
Because we cannot decrypt your vault, there is deliberately no “Forgot Password” link. That’s not a bug; it’s the design. A memorable passphrase (4+ random words), written down on paper in a locked spot, plus on-device biometrics for everyday unlock — that’s the pattern.
Common questions
If your servers were breached, could attackers read my vault?
No. Servers store ciphertext; there is no key to steal. A breach yields encrypted blobs without the keys to open them. Full architecture
Are my 2FA codes and media too?
Yes. Passwords, notes, TOTP secrets, photos, documents are all encrypted with the same client-side zero-knowledge model. See features
What if I lose my master password?
No one — not us, not your phone maker — can reset it. Write it down offline. That is the price of a zero-knowledge design. Recovery guide
